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Last year, Congress enacted legislation creating an innovative method of
resolving claims for childhood vaccine injuries.1 It establishes a mandatory no-fault
compensation system for persons injured through childhood vaccines. After the
no-fault proceedings, the claimant has the option of accepting the compensation
awarded, if the injury were found to be vaccine-related, or bringing a civil action
against the vaccine manufacturer in which several limitations on the manufacturer's
tort liability would apply. The legislation responded to two concerns: (1) liability for
these injuries was causing United States manufacturers to stop producing vaccines,
and (2) children injured by vaccines were often without a source of payment or
compensation for their medical and rehabilitative needs, leading to greater resort to
the tort system for some form of financial relief.2
Expanding tort liability and the tort system's impediment to product develop-
ment have been concerns raised by manufacturers in other industries who are seeking
reform in the product liability area through state and federal legislation. Efforts to
enact a federal product liability bill have been ongoing since the late 1970s with
legislation first introduced in the House of Representatives in 1980 by Rep.
Richardson Preyer 3 and in the Senate in 1982 by Senator Robert W. Kasten. 4 The
severity of the product liability problem may vary from industry to industry, but a
common factor is the unpredictability of product liability rules which continually
have been expanding in favor of the plaintiff.5 Proponents of product liability reform
argue that some of these expansions of liability have been unfair, and that the
unpredictable nature of variable product liability rules makes it difficult to make
reasonable actuarial assessments of future liability risks. 6
The approach Congress took in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986-which on the one hand sets up a no-fault compensation system and on the
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other hand modifies the tort law rules for injured persons who choose not to accept
compensation through that system-could be viewed as either a panacea for the
vaccine liability problem or as a precedent for an approach that Congress could take
in addressing the broader product liability problem. This Article will explain that the
dual compensation system/tort reform approach was a response to a unique situation
with childhood vaccines, and that this type of approach would not work in a broad
product liability bill.
Childhood Vaccine Crisis
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act addressed a crisis situation that
existed for products that provide tremendous societal benefits. Vaccines to protect
against serious and life-threatening diseases such as pertussis ("whooping cough"),
diptheria, tetanus, measles, mumps, rubella, polio, and small pox, are, without
doubt, vital products. It has been stated that "[vlaccines have contributed more to
public health in this country than any other medical product, device, or procedure.' '7
Because vaccines contain biological material, however, they carry a risk of adverse
effects. The Sabin polio vaccine, for example, is a live polio vaccine which contains
a greatly weakened or attenuated polio virus. 8 Since it is administered orally and does
not require boosters, it has replaced the Salk (injection) polio vaccine which is no
longer manufactured in the United States. 9 There is an unavoidable risk with the
Sabin vaccine, however, as it reproduces the weakened polio virus in the intestinal
tract which in very rare cases is a virulent virus rather than the weakened Sabin
virus.10 When this occurs, the person who received the virus and persons coming in
contact with that person may develop polio. Despite the risk of this unfortunate
occurrence, society has benefitted from its dramatic decrease in the incidence of
polio, a disease which killed or crippled hundreds of thousands of victims in the 19th
and 20th centuries. In reporting the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce noted:
Vaccination of children against deadly, disabling, but preventable infectious diseases
has been one of the most spectacularly effective public health initiatives this country has ever
undertaken. Use of vaccines has prevented thousands of children's deaths each year and has
substantially reduced the effects resulting from disease. Billions of medical and health-
related dollars have been saved by immunizations. And, through the development of
vaccines to prevent childhood diseases, significant scientific progress has been made in the
development of vaccines to prevent other types of diseases. In brief, the Nation's efforts to
protect its children by preventing disease have been-by every measure-a success."
Recently, however, an increase in tort lawsuits for injuries associated with
vaccines caused a number of United States vaccine manufacturers to withdraw from
7. See P. Huber, Will the New Vaccine Statute Give a Shot in the Arm to Tort Reform?, Legal Times, Mar. 9,
1987, at 9, col. 1-3.
8. See A. David, DTP: Drug Manufacturers' Liability in Vaccine-Related Injuries, 9 J. PROD. Ltm. 361, 376-77
(1986).
9. The Salk vaccine contains an inactivated or killed polio virus.
10. See A. David, supra note 8, at 376.
11. See House REPoRT, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.me. NE's 6345.
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the market.' 2 Faced with a dwindling vaccine supply and the imminent scarcity of a
much-needed product, Congress stepped in. While some commentators argue that tort
liability is a matter of state concern and, therefore, oppose federal legislation in this
area, Congress recognized that the threat to the availability of childhood vaccines
posed a national public health problem. 13
In that regard, the most significant precedential value of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act is that it stands for the recognition that products liability is a matter
of national concern. In a situation with one of the most severe liability problems and
one of the greatest potential losses to society if those problems were not solved, a
national solution was required. The House Energy and Commerce Committee noted:
The loss of any of the existing manufacturers of childhood vaccines at this time could
create a genuine public health hazard in this country. Currently, there is only one
manufacturer of the polio vaccine, one manufacturer of the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR)
vaccine, and two manufacturers of the DPT vaccine. Two States, Michigan and Massachu-
setts, produce their own DPT vaccine. Despite Congressional support, Federal vaccine
stockpiles maintained by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have never reached CDC's
recommended level of six-months' supply. Thus, the withdrawal of even a single
manufacturer would present the very real possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn,
increasing numbers of unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable
diseases.' 4
Not all products may present the same societal benefits as childhood vaccines, and the
loss of some other products might not pose the same national health hazards. Those
may have been concerns that motivated Congress to develop a no-fault compensation
system for this particular product. But the recognition that products liability is a
matter of interstate commerce and, therefore, is the responsibility of the federal
government does transcend generally among all products.
Childhood Vaccine Compensation Program
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 establishes a two-tiered
system for obtaining compensation for injuries resulting from immunizations that
state governments require children to receive as a condition of entry into school-
vaccines for polio, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT), and measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR). The first tier is a mandatory "no-fault" system under which compensation
for specific injuries related to childhood immunizations, listed in the Vaccine Injury
Table, is to be paid out of a Trust Fund established by the Act. The Trust Fund is to
be financed with the proceeds of an excise tax imposed on each dose of the covered
childhood vaccines. Funding for the program has not yet been authorized by
Congress, and the Act is not effective until that time.15
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 6346. ("The availability and use of vaccines to
prevent childhood diseases is among the Nation's top public health priorities."; "The Federal government has the
responsibility to ensure that all children in need of immunization have access to them and to ensure that all children who
are injured by vaccines have access to sufficient compensation for their injuries.").
14. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADxre. NE's 6348.
15. See S. Rich, Administration Attacks Vaccine Law, Wash. Post, March 6, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
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If a person has been injured by a vaccine covered by the Act, a claim must first
be brought through this no-fault compensation system before a tort lawsuit may be
filed against a vaccine manufacturer. The Act's objective is to provide a more speedy
and more certain compensation alternative to the tort system, so that litigation is the
last resort.
A claim for compensation is made by filing a petition with a United States
district court. 16 The petition must contain a variety of materials necessary to make a
finding as to whether compensation is to be made, including evidence that the person
received a vaccine listed in the Vaccine Injury Table of the Act or contracted polio
from a recipient of an oral polio vaccine, and that the person sustained or had
significantly aggravated an injury listed in the Table and within the time periods
specified in the Table. ' 7 The Secretary of Health and Human Services must be named
as the Respondent to all petitions for compensation. No other persons may intervene
or otherwise be made a party to the compensation proceeding. 18 The district court
then is to designate a special master to assist in obtaining evidence, information, and
testimony, and to conduct hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and submit these findings to the district court. 19 After the special
master submits his findings of fact or conclusions of law, the district court determines
whether to award compensation.20 In making that determination, the only issue is
whether the injury is vaccine-related. There need be no showing that a vaccine
manufacturer was at fault.
If the petitioner's injury is listed in the Table, and occurred within the time
period set forth in the Table, there is a presumption that the injury was caused by the
vaccine. 2' This presumption can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence,
submitted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or a vaccine manufacturer,
that a particular petitioner's injury is not vaccine-related.2 2 Evidence that may be
submitted to overcome the presumption includes proof of other infections, traumas or
conditions, but does not include speculative or hypothetical matters or explanations.2 3
Petitioners may also seek to prove that an injury not covered by the Table was caused
by a vaccine. The entire proceeding, from date of filing through special master
proceedings and court review, is to take place as expeditiously as possible and, in no
case, should take more than one year.2 4
If the district court determines that an injury is vaccine-related, it will award
compensation to be paid from the Trust Fund established by the Act.2 s Compensation
16. S. 1744, supra note 1, at § 2111, 132 CoNG. Rec. H11,598-99 (1986).
17. Id. at § 2111(c), 132 CoNG. REc. H11,599.
18. Id. at § 2112(b), 132 CONG. REc. Hl,599.
19. Id. at § 2112(c), 132 CONG. REc. H11,599.
20. Id. at § 2112(d), 132 CONG. REC. HII,599.
21. Id. at § 2113(a), 132 CoNG. P.c. H11,599-600.
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 2113(b), 132 CONG. REc. HI 1,600; HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 6359.
24. S. 1744, supra note 1, at § 2112(d), 132 CONG. REc. H11,599; House RePORT, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6358.
25. S. 1744, supra note 1, at § 2115(a), 132 CONG. Rec. HII,601.
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is made for actual, unreimbursable medical expenses, rehabilitation costs, and lost
wages. 26 The award is to include an amount to provide for reasonable attorneys' fees
and other costs incurred in proceedings on the petition.27 The court may, in its
discretion, make an award for attorneys' fees and costs even if it does not award
compensation on a petition, if it determines that the action was brought in good faith
and that there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the action was brought. 28
In addition, the court may award compensation for pain and suffering up to
$250,000.29 In the case of death, a fixed award of $250,000 is made. 30 Compensation
under the program may not include punitive or exemplary damages or any form of
compensation, other than death benefits or lost earnings, that is not for the health,
education, or welfare of the injured person. 3'
There are provisions in the Act for adjustment of projected unreimbursable
expenses after the initial judgment is made if the petitioner shows that the award is
insufficient to meet its unreimbursable expenses. 32 The district court's judgment is
the final deternination of the compensation petition, except that either the petitioner
or the Secretary of Health and Human Services may request a review of the judgment
by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court is located. 33 The
request for an appeal must be made and delivered to the other party within 60 days. 34
After the judgment of the district court regarding the petition for compensation
has become final, the petitioner may, within 90 days from that date, decide in writing
either to accept the court's judgment or to file a tort action for damages for the
vaccine-related injury or death. The petitioner's decision must be filed in writing even
if the court has refused to award compensation. If the petitioner fails to file a decision
in writing within the 90-day period, he or she will be deemed to have accepted the
court's judgment. 35
In sum, the compensation proceeding is relatively simple. There is no discovery,
cross-examination, pleadings, or trial. The power of the special master to require
evidence, submission of information, and require testimony, is intended to replace
the usual rules of discovery in civil actions in federal courts. The only issues relevant
to the compensation proceedings are whether the petitioner suffered a compensable
injury and, if so, the extent of compensable damages. Congress structured the Act so
as to encourage persons to take advantage of the compensation system by making it
26. Id. The measure of lost earnings for adults is to be determined in accordance with accepted actuarial principles.
In the case of a child who sustains a vaccine injury before the age of 18, compensation is awarded for a loss of earnings
after the age of 18 determined on the basis of the average gross weekly earnings of workers in the private, non-farm sector,
with offsets for appropriate taxes and the average cost of a health insurance policy. Payments for projected expenses are
to be paid prospectively, on an annual basis.
27. Id. at § 2115(e), 132 Co.G. Rec. HI1,601.
28. Id.
29. Id. at § 2115(a), 132 CoNG. REc. Hll,601.
30. Id.
31. Id. at § 2115(c), 132 CoNG. REc. HII,601.
32. Id. at § 2112(0, 132 CoNG. Rec. H11,599.
33. Id. at § 2112(g), 132 CoxG. REc. H11,599.
34. Id.
35. Id. at § 2121, 132 CoNG. REc. H11,602.
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(1) mandatory, (2) not based on proving fault for a vaccine-related injury, (3) speedy,
and (4) fair in terms of the amount of compensation.
As a trade-off for the certainty of no-fault compensation and as an added
incentive to have less resort to the tort system, the Act modifies tort law for vaccine
injury suits in several respects. Except to the extent that the Act has established a rule
of law for such actions, tort actions for vaccine-related injuries will be governed by
applicable state law. Thus, tort litigation under these modifications of law is the
secondary system of recovery for vaccine injuries.
First, the Act adopts the principle contained in comment k of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that a vaccine manufacturer should not be liable for
injuries or deaths resulting from unavoidable side effects if its products are properly
prepared and accompanied by adequate directions and warnings.3 6 Under the Act, a
vaccine is presumed to be accompanied by proper directions and warnings if the
manufacturer demonstrates that the directions and warnings comply in all material
respects with relevant federal law governing the approval and labeling of the vaccine.
This presumption may be overcome if the claimant shows that the manufacturer
engaged in fraudulent conduct or intentionally or unlawfully withheld information in
obtaining pre-market approval for the vaccine from the Federal Food and Drug
Administration, or if the claimant shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
manufacturer failed to exercise due care notwithstanding its compliance with Federal
Food and Drug Administration requirements. The legislative history to the Act
explains that the comment k principle was adopted for tort lawsuits because the Act's
crafters believed that claims based on injuries involving unavoidable risks of vaccines
should be resolved in the no-fault compensation system rather than in the tort system.
The Committee Report notes:
Given the existence of the compensation system in this bill, the Committee strongly
believes that Comment k is appropriate and necessary as the policy for civil actions seeking
damages in tort. Vaccine-injured persons will now have an appealing alternative to the tort
system. Accordingly, if they cannot demonstrate under applicable law either that a vaccine
was improperly prepared or that it was accompanied by improper direction or inadequate
warnings [they] should pursue recompense in the compensation system, not the tort
system. 37
If a person's vaccine-related injury is what would be considered an "unavoidable"
risk of the vaccine, and the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by
proper warnings, a tort claim should be defeated.
Second, vaccine manufacturers may not be held liable in tort lawsuits for
their failure to provide warnings directly to the vaccine recipient, rather than
physicians. 38 This provision overrules several court decisions that have held drug
manufacturers liable for failure to provide direct warnings to the patient rather than
to an intermediary such as a doctor, nurse, or pharmacist who can be expected to
36. Id. at § 2122(b), 132 CONG. REc. Hl1,603.
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Coo CONG. & An~emm. NEws 6367.
38. S. 1744, supra note 1, at § 2122(c), 132 CoNG. REc. HI1,603.
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know about the product and its risks, and who is responsible for informing the
patient. 39
Third, a vaccine manufacturer will be protected against punitive damages in a
tort lawsuit if it shows that its product complied with applicable requirements under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and specified provisions of the Public
Health Service Act.40 The legislative history explains the rationale for this provision:
The Committee believes that punitive damages should be assessed only where particularly
reprehensible, conscious behavior is involved. Where a manufacturer has attempted in good
faith to comply with a government standard-even if the standard provides inadequate
protection to the public-the manufacturer should not be assessed punitive damages absent
evidence that it engaged in reprehensible behavior that directly resulted in the establishment
of maintenance of the standard's inadequacy. 4'
This protection against punitive damages will not apply if the manufacturer
(1) engaged in fraud or intentional and wrongful withholding of information from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services during any phase of a proceeding for
approval of the vaccine, (2) intentionally or wrongfully withheld information relating
to the safety or efficacy of the vaccine after its approval, or (3) engaged in other
criminal or illegal activity relating to the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine. In
addition, trials will be divided into separate proceedings on liability, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages, so that evidence on the extent of the claimants'
injury or on actions of the defendant that allegedly justify punitive damages does not
prejudice the findings as to causation and fault.
A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Problem?
The approach Congress took to address the children's vaccine liability problem,
which creates a no-fault system as the primary method of compensation, is,
undeniably, a response to a unique problem.
First, children's vaccines are unlike other products. Children are required by law
in every state to be immunized in order to attend public school. The fact that state
governments require children to undergo a risk in order to protect society as a whole,
was seen by Congress as justification for development of a national fund to
compensate children who are injured because of these risks.42
Second, unlike some other products, the incidence of serious injury with
children's vaccines is very low. 43 Thus, a vaccine compensation system can be
self-funding by adding a very small excise tax to the price of vaccines.44 It would not
be as easy to finance a compensation system for other products which have higher
39. See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984) (warnings associated with polio vaccine
must be provided to patient); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)
(same rule); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (same rule).
40. S. 1744, supra note 1, at § 2123, 132 COGw. REc. H11,603.
41. See HoUse REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-29, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CooE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWs 6369-70.
42. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE Co.e. & ADMIN. NEws 6347.
43. Id.
44. As noted above, the funding mechanism for the vaccine compensation program has not been established.
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incidences of serious injury and, therefore, would require funding from outside
sources, such as general revenues.
Third, the children's vaccine liability insurance situation was more widely felt
than the liability crisis that exists with most other products. Most of the vaccine
manufacturers in the United States have withdrawn from the market. 45 The loss of
even one more manufacturer could mean that some children would be unable to
receive vaccines, which would create a very serious public health problem. 46
Based on these justifications for having a no-fault compensation system for
vaccines, Congress set out to achieve two objectives: to provide an expeditious
method of compensating children who are injured because of vaccines and to make
liability for vaccine manufacturers more predictable so that the supply of vaccines in
the United States will be adequate. 47 Assuming Congress sets the Act in operation by
authorizing an excise tax to fund the compensation program, its success will be
determined over time. At present, a few considerations lend to its prognosis.
The first of Congress' objectives, to create an efficient method of providing
adequate compensation for vaccine-injured persons, can be achieved only if the
compensation proceedings are not abused. The overriding guideline of those
proceedings is simplification. The burden will be on the district courts and the
appointed special masters to administer the compensation program within these
guidelines. Attempts by either side to interject discovery into these proceedings or to
raise issues other than causation of the injury and the extent of damages, will defeat
this objective.
The second objective, to make vaccine liability more predictable, will be
accomplished only if the no-fault compensation program becomes the primary means
of redress for vaccine-related injuries, meaning that the majority of claims that
otherwise would be resolved in the tort system are resolved in the compensation
system. Congress could have more greatly assured this result by making the no-fault
compensation system the exclusive remedy for persons injured by vaccines. 48
Instead, Congress attempted to make the compensation program an appealing
alternative to tort litigation and to reduce incentives for persons to choose tort suits
as a means for resolving vaccine injury claims. It did so in several ways.
First, the Act makes the filing of a petition in the no-fault compensation system
mandatory before a tort lawsuit may be filed. In deciding whether to file a lawsuit,
a petitioner who has been awarded compensation will weigh this assured and
immediate recovery against the possibility of greater recovery at some time in the
45. See supra text accompanying note 14.
46. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE COsG. & ADon. NEws 6348. One can find
a similar reduction in the number of sporting goods manufacturers, but one does not find as direct adverse health impacts.
See 133 Coso. REc. S2,999 (March 11, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kasten).
47. See HOUSE REPORT , supra note 2, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE Coxo. & AD.MI. NEws 6348.
48. A report by the American Medical Association Ad Hoe Committee on Vaccine Injury Compensation explains
that the goals of continued availability of vaccines, development of improved vaccines, and participation of health workers
in vaccine programs will not be met unless a federal no-fault compensation system is the exclusive remedy of claimants
and not merely an alternative to tort litigation. See M. Goldsmith, AMA Offers Recommendations for Vaccine Injury
Compensation, 252 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 2937, 2939 (Dec. 7, 1984).
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future if a tort lawsuit is successful. Second, the compensation provided for in the
no-fault compensation program covers the petitioner's actual unreimbursable ex-
penses and may compensate for pain and suffering. Third, the Act adopts three
principles of tort law that, in the vaccine lawsuit context, may modify the rules that
would otherwise apply in some states, making it more difficult for claimants to
recover in a tort lawsuit. Despite these incentives for a claimant to accept a
compensation award in the no-fault program system, it is uncertain whether more
claims will be resolved through the program. Congress did not remove countervailing
incentives that may favor tort litigation. For example, the prospect of a higher
contingency fee may prompt claimants' attorneys to encourage claimants to reject the
award and file a tort lawsuit. In light of the tort law modifications established by the
Act, however, a realistic claimant's attorney would carefully consider the prospects
of a successful tort lawsuit against the assurance of compensation already awarded.
Furthermore, even though the tort law standards established by the Act follow general
principles of tort law and will actually change the law in only some states, 49 judges
may be less likely to find ways to expand tort liability for vaccine manufacturers
given the existence of a no-fault compensation alternative. But these are consider-
ations that may influence the course of individual claims, and it is difficult to forecast
the outcome in the aggregate-a point that creates doubt as to whether greater
predictability for vaccine liability will be achieved.
Congress may have decided to retain the tort system for vaccine injury claims,
at the expense of greater predictability, as a means of providing incentives for the
manufacture of safe vaccines. For example, under the Act, vaccine manufacturers
will be subject to liability in tort lawsuits if vaccines are not properly prepared or are
not accompanied by adequate directions or warnings. It could be argued that under a
no-fault compensation program, particularly where compensation derives from a
general fund and is not linked to individual responsibility, expeditious and certain
compensation is provided for at the expense of removing those incentives. The
argument would be that the absence of a linkage between fault and payment for
injuries removes incentives for vaccine manufacturers to act safely. Interestingly,
representatives of professional consumer groups and trial attorneys have consistently
opposed the establishment of fault standards of liability in federal products liability
legislation proposed in Congress, on the theory that absolute liability is the greatest
incentive for safety. 50 A fundamental principle of tort theory, however, is that placing
liability on persons who act wrongfully creates incentives for safety. For this reason,
it could be argued that an exclusive no-fault compensation system might not provide
safety incentives.
In order to accomplish this objective within the framework of an exclusive
no-fault compensation system, other methods of penalizing unsafe conduct and
49. The unavoidably unsafe principle, for example, is followed by most courts. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980).
50. See, e.g., S. 100, Product Liability Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-85 (1985) (Statement of Gene
Kimmelman, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America).
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rewarding safe conduct could be developed. For example, instead of funding the
program through an excise tax, some method could be developed for making
assessments on vaccine manufacturers in accordance to the incidences of injuries
related to their products.
A Window for the Future?
The structure of the no-fault compensation system for vaccine injuries signifies
that this type of system may work, if at all, in very narrowly defined situations. The
Act's no-fault system is designed for specified products and specific illnesses that will
"trigger" compensation. Under the Table in the Act, it is relatively simple to
determine whether a claimant's injury is vaccine-related.
Attempts to create broader compensation systems for product injuries have been
made in Congress. In the 99th Congress, the Senate Commerce Committee con-
sidered a proposal to establish a compensation system for all products. 5' After months
of evaluation of this proposal, including receipt of comments from professional
consumer groups and representatives of manufacturers, all of whom were dissatisfied
with the proposal, the Senate Commerce Committee gave up on this approach.5 2 The
fundamental problem with establishing a claims system to cover all products was
trying to define the "trigger" for compensation. Since it is not practical or feasible
to attempt to list every single product that currently is subject to tort liability, and to
list every imaginable injury, illness, or disease that may be caused by all products,
a broad products claims system would have to contain some alternative "trigger."
The proposed Senate bill attempted to frame a "trigger" along the strictest lines of
strict liability standards.
The Senate Bill, S. 1999, required manufacturers to make payment of actual,
unreimbursable economic losses ("net economic loss") if a product were "unrea-
sonably dangerous" and a proximate cause of the claimant's harm while being used
in a manner intended or anticipated by the manufacturer. 53 A manufacturer would not
be required to pay the claim if the claimant was grossly negligent.5 4 The Bill
established a presumption that a product is "unreasonably dangerous," which the
manufacturer could rebut by showing that the product's utility so outweighed the risk
of harm that it was reasonable to produce it, or that the risk of harm was apparent or
was a matter of common knowledge. 55 The Bill spelled out the warnings or
instructions that must have been provided to rebut the presumption that the product
was "unreasonably dangerous. '56 It also established a presumption of proximate
cause in certain situations involving toxic harm.57
51. S. 1999, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
52. See Product Liability Voluntary Claims and Uniform Standards Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-148 (1986).
53. S. 1999, supra note 51, at § 205(a) (1986).
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 205(b).
56. Id. at § 205(b) and (c).
57. Id. at § 205(d).
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Based on these guidelines, a manufacturer would have to determine whether a
claim should be paid and notify the claimant.5 8 If a claim were denied, the claimant
would have the option of filing a civil action to obtain compensation for "net
ecomonic loss" under the standards outlined above, or filing a tort lawsuit governed
by the tort rules in Title III of the Act, which would restrict the liability of
manufacturers in some respects.
Obviously, this "trigger" for payment of compensation in an "expedited
products liability claims procedure" was very different from the Vaccine Injury Table
which lists the products and related injuries that are compensable. The products
liability "trigger" looked like a very detailed jury instruction in a products liability
lawsuit.
Given the complexity and subjective nature of the determination whether
compensation should be paid under this expedited products liability claims procedure,
it was not perceived as an appealing alternative to litigation. Representatives of both
sides of the issue agreed that this approach would simply generate uncertainty and
litigation over whether a particular product should give rise to compensation, and that
it would not serve the goal of expeditiously providing compensation for injured
persons.
After months of study, the Senate Commerce Committee abandoned the attempt
to design a broad products compensation system and worked on procedures to foster
settlement of products liability lawsuits. 5 9 The lesson learned from this exercise,
however, is useful. An injury compensation system can serve the goal of expedi-
tiously providing compensation only if the event which triggers payment is clearly
defined and applicable on some objective basis. The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act did this by listing vaccines and vaccine-related injuries in a Table in the
Act. In workers' compensation, the triggering event is an injury "arising out of and
in the course of the employment.'"'6 Unless a simple and objective "trigger" is
developed for all types of product injuries, a broad-scale product compensation
system is not achievable. Short of creating absolute liability for every injury in which
a product was somehow involved, there would have to be a workable, objective
guideline for determining whether a product defect caused the injury. Given the
complexity of determining "defectiveness"-as evidenced by the myriad of stan-
dards applied by courts-it seems unlikely that this could be accomplished.
CONCLUSION
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 is a unique response to the
severe liability problems of a particular type of product. Whether the Act will actually
be made operative by an authorization of funding for the compensation program and
whether it is a successful resolution of those liability concerns remains to be seen. But
two comments can be made on its precedential value.
58. Id. at § 206.
59. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
60. See generally A. LRsom, \VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6 (Desk ed. 1987).
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First, by enacting this legislation Congress recognized its responsibility for
major products liability problems. Congress has in the past acknowledged its
interstate commerce responsibility for products by enacting legislation regulating
product safety-the Consumer Product Safety Act,6 1 the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 62 the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 63 and so on-
but this step into products liability is a groundbreaker.
Second, the approach to the vaccine liability problem is unlikely to be followed
on a broader basis. This is true for several reasons. The mandatory nature of
childhood immunizations and the ability to fund a compensation program without
outside sources may have motivated Congress to take this approach. In addition, the
inability to define an objective "trigger" would thwart development of a broad
product-injury compensation program. The bottom line-this particular approach to
liability problems is unlikely to be a window for the future.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1983).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1983).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1983).
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